This section contains recommendations to ensure the security of apps on Android devices.
Source code review
Source code review can detect a broad range of security issues, including those identified in this document. Android strongly encourages both manual and automated source code review.
- Follow comprehensive security guidance when conducting reviews to ensure coverage. Utilize relevant internal or external standards to ensure consistent and complete reviews.
- Run a linter, such as the Android Studio linter, on all app code using the Android SDK and correct any identified issues.
- Analyze native code using an automated tool that can detect memory management issues, such as buffer overflows and off-by-one errors.
- The Android build system supports many of the LLVM sanitizers, such as AddressSanitizer and UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer, which can be used for runtime analysis of memory-related issues. Combined with fuzzing, supported in Android through libFuzzer, sanitizers can uncover unusual edge cases requiring further investigation.
- A knowledgeable security assessor should review higher risk code, such as crypto, payment processing, and PII processing.
Automated testing can help detect a broad range of security issues and should be performed regularly.
- Run the latest version of CTS regularly throughout the development process to detect problems early and reduce time to correction. Android uses CTS as part of continuous integration in our automated build process, which builds multiple times per day.
- Automate security testing of interfaces, including testing with malformed inputs (fuzz testing). Android's build system supports libFuzzer for writing fuzz tests.
Vulnerability scanning can help ensure that pre-installed apps are free of known security vulnerabilities. Advanced detection can reduce the time and cost required with addressing these vulnerabilities and preventing risk to users and devices.
- Scan all pre-installed apps using an industry-recognized app vulnerability scanning tool and address detected vulnerabilities.
Potentially Harmful Applications
It is important to ensure that no pre-installed apps on your device are accidental Potentially Harmful Applications (PHAs). You are responsible for the behavior of all apps that are included on your devices.
Hostile downloaders are apps that are not directly considered harmful but instead download other potentially harmful apps.
- Ensure there is user disclosure for all pre-installed apps that use the
- Ensure that the developer is contractually obligated not to install any apps as UID 0.
- Evaluate permissions declared in the manifest of all apps to be installed through the developer's network.
- Ensure that the developer is contractually obligated to scan all download URLs of auto-updater and installer apps with Google Safe Browsing API before serving apps to the device.
- Starting with Android 9, require all developers to use
UPDATE_PACKAGESpermission instead of the
INSTALL_PACKAGESpermission. When combined with
UPDATE_PACKAGESallows privileged apps to be granted finely scoped install privileges based on their intended usage instead of the more broad
Cryptomining apps are those that attempt to leverage a device's hardware or cloud-based computing to generate currency in the form of "coins", typically by way of blockchain technology. If you intend to offer this service as an alternate form of currency or in exchange for services, ensure you request the user's permission before leveraging the device's hardware to run this service, including explicit consent that this will impact battery runtime.
Impostor apps are defined as ones that attempt to disguise themselves as a well known app, such as YouTube or Facebook.
- Prior to device launch, scan all pre-loaded apps for vulnerabilities.
Excessive permissions for pre-installed apps can create a security risk. Restrict pre-installed apps to the minimum necessary permissions and ensure they don't have access to unnecessary permissions or privileges.
- Do not grant unnecessary permissions or privileges to pre-installed apps. Thoroughly review apps with system privileges as they may have very sensitive permissions.
- Ensure that all permissions requested are relevant and necessary for the functionality of that specific app.
App signatures play an important role in device security and are used for permissions checks and software updates. When selecting a key to use for signing apps, it is important to consider whether an app will be available only on a single device or common across multiple devices.
- Ensure that apps are not signed with a key that is publicly known, such as the AOSP developer key.
- Ensure that keys used to sign apps are managed in a manner consistent with industry-standard practices for handling sensitive keys, including an hardware security module (HSM) that provides limited, auditable access.
- Ensure that apps are not signed with the platform key. Doing so gives an app access to platform signature permissions, which are very powerful and only intended to be used by components of the operating system. System apps should use privileged permissions.
- Ensure that apps with the same package name are not signed with different keys. This often occurs when creating an app for different devices, especially when using the platform key. If the app is device-independent, use the same key across devices. If the app is device-specific, create unique package names per device and key.
Isolating apps and processes
The Android sandboxing model provides extra security around apps and processes when used correctly.
Isolating root processes
Root processes are the most frequent target of privilege escalation attacks; reducing the number of root processes reduces risk of privilege escalation.
- Ensure that devices run the minimum necessary code as root. Where possible, use a regular Android process rather than a root process. If a process must run as root on a device, document the process in an AOSP feature request so it can be publicly reviewed.
- Where possible, root code should be isolated from untrusted data and accessed via interprocess communication (IPC). For example, reduce root functionality to a small Service accessible via Binder and expose the Service with signature permission to an app with low or no privileges to handle network traffic.
- Root processes must not listen on a network socket.
- Root processes must not include a general-purpose runtime, such as a Java VM).
Isolating system apps
In general, pre-installed apps should not run with the shared system unique identifier (UID). If it is necessary for an app to use the shared UID of system or another privileged service (e.g., phone), the app should not export any services, broadcast receivers, or content providers that can be accessed by third-party apps installed by users.
- Ensure devices run the minimum necessary code as system. Where possible, use an Android process with its own UID rather than reusing the system UID.
- Where possible, system code should be isolated from untrusted data and expose IPC only to other trusted processes.
- System processes must not listen on a network socket. This is a CTS requirement.
The Android Application Sandbox provides apps with an expectation of isolation from other processes on the system, including root processes and debuggers. Unless debugging is specifically enabled by the app and the user, no app should violate that expectation.
- Ensure root processes do not access data within individual app data folders, unless using a documented Android debugging method.
- Ensure root processes do not access memory of apps, unless using a documented Android debugging method.
- Ensure devices do not include any app that accesses data or memory of other apps or processes.